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1.  In  a  statement  on  EEC-Japan  relations  adopted  on  19  June  the  Council 
"invited  the  Commission  to  prepare  a  comprehensive  review  of  Community/ 
Japan  relations  with  appropriate  recommendations  for  action,  as  a  basis  for 
discussion  and  decision  in  the  autumn  of  1985". 
2.  The  Community's  economic  and  trade  relations  with  Japan  have  been  a 
subject  of  mounting  concern  ever  since  a  real  imbalance  became  evident 
during  the  1970s.  An  indication of  the  trend  is  provided  by  the 
import/export  cover  ratio,  which  has  declined  from  72.6%  in  1970  through 
44%  in  1975  to  its present  Level  of  around  35%. 
The  Council  has  been  expressing  its  concern  at  this  apparently 
inexorable  trend  since  1978. 
The  Commission,  for  its part,  initiated a  process  of  regular  consultations 
with  the  Japanese  authorities  as  early  as  1973,  hoping  thereby  to  deal  with 
trade  problems  in  general  and  in  particular  to  improve  conditions  for 
Community  exporters  to  Japan. 
1  In  March  1978  Japan  ''foresaw"  a  substantial  rise  in  its manufactured  imports. 
Some  increase  did  occur  in  fact  slightly  in  1978  and  1979  (to  22.5  %),  fell  to  19% 
in  1980  and  rose  again  to  23.8%  in  1984),  though  the  increase  fell  short  of 
2  what  had  been  hoped. 
--------------- ------------------------------
1Thc  !Jshih<l  Declar<ltion  of  24  March  1978. 
21n  1984  manufactures  accounted  for  44%  of  Community  imports,  yet  the 
Community  too  has  to  import  a  substantial  proportion  of  its  fuel  and  raw 
material  requirements. - 2  -
The  other  side  of  the  equation  - the  concentration  of  Japanese  exports  on 
a  number  of  sensitive  sectors  of  Community  industry  at  a  time  of  industrial 
upheaval- has  been  causing  the  Council  anxiety  since  1980.1  In  a 
statement  in  November  that  year  the  Council  stressed  its ''serious  concern" 
at  the  trade  situation,  deploring  the  "inadequate  penetration"  of  Community 
goods  into  the  Japanese  market  and  the  ''concentration"  of  Japanese  exports 
'bna  small  number  of  particularly  sensitive  sectors". 
By  this  stage  the  Council  was  calling for  a  comprehensive  joint  strategy  on 
2  Japan.  This  meant  a  coordinated  approach  to  the  three  major  topics  in  our 
relations  with  that  country  :  genuine  opening  up  of  the  Japanese  market  to 
Community  products,  "moderation"  of  Japanese  exports  of  a  growing  number  of 
sensitive  products  (starting with  cars  in  1980  and  extending  by  1982  to 
various  electronic  goods),  and  the  evolution  of  balanced  industrial,  scientific 
and  technical  cooperation  between  the  Community  and  Japan.  These  themes  were 
developed  not  only  in  bilateral  consultations  but  also  in  GATT  and  the  Western 
economic  summits  also addressed  the  problem. 
Since  then  hardly  a  year  has  goneby  without  expressions  of  concern  on  the  part 
of  the  Council  and  the  announcement  by  Japan  of  new  market  Liberalization 
measures.  Seven  Liberalization  ''packages"  have  been  unveiled  since 
January  1982,  plus  the  "three-year  action  programme''  announced  on  30  July 
this  year. 
1 Statement  of  25  November  1980. 
2 Statement  of  7  February  1978. - 3  -
Although  the  action  programme  sets  out  some  new  principals  in  relation  to 
standards  and  certification of  products,  such  as  the  principle  that  "freedo~ 
should  be  the  rule  and  intervention  by  the  authorities  the  exception",  its 
translation  into  concrete  realities  at  the  Level  of  regulations  and  procedures 
will  be  phased  over  three  years  and  for  certain areas  continues  to  be 
characterised  by  uncertainty  and  obscurity.  In  any  case,  no  amount  of  tinkering 
with  the  bureaucratic  formalities  can  produce  import  growth  in  short  order, 
and  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  Legal  or  administrative  rule  changes  will 
be  accompanied  by  the  necessary  changes  of  attitude  and  behaviour  on  the 
part  of  the  officials  who  have  to  implement  them,  or  of  the  Japanese  business 
community  in  general.  Finally  a  certain  number  of  requests  put  forward  by 
the  Commission  have  not  been  taken  into account. 
So  far  there  has  been  no  real  turnaround  in  the  trade  figures.  A certain 
moderation  of  Japanese  exports  of  sensitive  products  has  been  observed  but 
new  products  have  come  on  to  the  market.  The  volume  of  Community  manufactured 
exports  to  Japan  is still small,  though  its exports  of  semi-manufactures 
(non-ferrous  metals  and  chemicals)  are  on  the  increase.  There  has  been  some 
moderation  of  Japan's  exports  of  sensitive products.  The  rate  of  growth  of 
the  Community's  trade deficit  has  slowed  but  it  reached$  12  billion  in  1984. 
In  these  circumstances,  even  assuming  10  % annual  growth  in  EEC  exports  and 
no  change  in  Japan's,  it  would  take  13  years  to  restore  the  balance. 
3.  As  we  hope  to  make  clear,  the  "Japanese  problem"  has  a  number  of  characteris-
tic  features  : 
•.•  I •• - 4  -
- the  crux  of  the  problem  for  foreign  exporters  of  manufactured  goods  to 
Japan  is  not  so  much  visible  import  barriers  such  as  tariffs or  quantitative 
restrictions,  which  with  a  number  of  exceptions  are  generally  modest,  but 
the  protracted  and  unpredictable  technical  certification and  registration 
procedures  and  above  all  the  habits  and  attitudes  bred  of  Japan's 
vertically  and  horizontally  integrated  industrial,  commercial  and  financial 
groups; 
- these  features  of  the  Japanese  system  are  undoubtedly  chanqinq,but  proqress 
is  slow,  and  1n  addition  the  government's  macro-economic  policy  acts  as 
a  constraint  on  the  growth  of  domestic  demand;  this  is  an  area  where  it  is 
difficult,  if not  counterproductive,  for  foreign  governments  to  intervene  -
it  is  up  to  the  Japanese  Government  and  the  country's  businessmen  to 
accelerate  the  pace  of  change; 
-while  Japan's  various  trading  partners,  whether  developed  or  developing, 
may  be  more  or  less  competitive  among  themselves,  they  all  by  and  Large 
face  similar difficulties  in  penetrating  the  Japanese  market.  To  put 
it another  way,  the  accumulated  current  account  and  trade  imbalances, 
with  no  prospect  of  relief  i~ sight,  are  dangerous  because  they  threaten 
the  whole  operation  of  the  multilateral  trade  and  payments  system. 
Simply  to  set  the  $150  billion  estimated  US  trade deficit  for  1985 
against  the  estimated  $40  million  Japanese  surplus  is to measure  the  almost 
intolerable  strains  such  imbalances  impose  on  the  multilateral  system. - 5  -
4.  While  this  Communication  is  intended  to  convey  a  full  picture of  the 
whole  spectrum  of  EEC-Japanese  relations,  we  feel  it appropriate  to 
concentrate  on  the  key  question  of  economic  and  trade  relations. 
5.  As  a  follow-up  to  Prime  Minister  Nakasone's  visit  to  the  Commission  on 
19  July,  there  are  plans  for  a  meeting  of  a  group  of  Members  of the  Commission 
and  their opposite  numbers  in  the  Japanese  Government  to  be  held  on 
18  November  • 
The  President  of  the  Commission  is  also  intending  to  pay  an  official visit 
to  Japan  in  January  of  next  year. 
The  next  Western  summit,  due  to  take  place  in  Tokyo  next  May,  will  in  any 
case  provide  an  opportunity  to exert  fresh  top-level  pressure  on  the 
Japanese  Government. 
6.  Accordingly,  the  Commission  intends  to  follow  up  the  present  essentially 
analytic  Communication  with  a  second  Communication  containing  recommendations 
for  action  based  on  the  outcome  of  discussions  in  the  Council  and  the 
findings  reported  by  Members  of  the  Commission  on  their  return  from  Tokyo. - 6  -
I.  JAPAN'S  ECONOMY,  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  AND  PLACE  IN  THE  WORLD  ECONOMY 
7.  In  recent  years  Japan  has built  up  sizeable  current  account  surpluses 
which  have  been  accompanied  by  large  capital  outflows.  The  persistence of 
this  trend  poses  a  threat  to  international  monetary  and  trade  balances. 
8.  Japan  has  one  of  the  strongest  economic  growth  records  of  all  OECD 
countries.  Real  GNP  growth  ran  at  3.4%  in  1983  and  5.8%  in  1984,  compared 
with  0.9%  and  2.2%  in  the  Community.  The  latest  forecasts  for  1985  point 
to  an  annual  growth  figure  of  the  order  of  4.7%. 
Domestic  demand  in  Japan  has  been  growing  since  1983  at  an  average  of  around 
4%  in  real  terms,  as  against  5%  in  1983  and  8.7%  in  1984  in  the  United  States 
and  about  2%  in  the  Community.  The  external  contribution  to  growth  remains 
high  <1.6%  in  1983,  2%  in  1984  and  a  likely  1%  in  1985  and  1986). 
9.  As  a  result  of  certain social  characteristics  in  Japan  and  the  bias 
of  the  fiscal  system  in  favour  of  savings  and  against  credit  expenditure, 
the  level  of  savings  is  very  high  compared  to  that  in  other  major 
industrial  countries.  However,  despite  the  relatively  high  growth  rate 
in  Japan  domestic  demand  has  been  insufficient  to  absorb  these  savings. 
The  result  has  been  a  Large  trade  surplus  and  growing  capital  outflows. 
These  imbalances  indicate  that  there  is scope for  a  higher  level  of  domestic 
demand  which  would  have  the  effect  of  reducing  both  the  trade  surplus  and 
the  outflow  of  capital  and  contribute to  a  more  balanced  international 
trading  system. - 7  -
10.  1  Japan's  pdrticularly narrow  tax  base  meant  that  budget  deficits 
grew  rapidly  during  the  1970s,  with  a  corresponding  increase  in  official 
debt,  now  standing  at  67.5%  of  GNP. 
The  Japanese  Government  has  set  a  target  date  of  1990  for  cancelling the 
issue  of  bonds  to  cover  the  current  budget  deficit,  so  the  policy  of 
restrictive  budgets  is  going  to  continue  for  several  years. 
Nevertheless  to  achieve  a  better  balance  between  saving  and  investment, 
either the  financial  surplus  of  households  must  be  reduced  by  an  increase 
1n  consumption  or  households'  savings  must  be  absorbed  in greater quantity 
by  capital  formation  in  the  sectors  where  there  are deficiencies  e.g. 
residential  buildings  and  public  investment. 
11.  An  advisory  committee  on  external  economic  issues  (the  Okita  Committee) 
reported  on  9  April  this  year.  It  stressed  the  need  to  stimulate domestic 
demand,  and  suggested: 
- cutting of  red  tape  and  regulations; 
- extension  of  the  five-day  week  and  reduction of  hours  worked; 
- improvement  of  infrastructure  by  infusing  public  works  with  private-sector 
dynamism; 
- tax  reforms. 
So  far,  the  government  has  not  taken  any  decisions  on  these  recommendations. 
In  any  event  it  is  questionable  whether  such  steps  would  of  themselves  be 
sufficient  to  bring  about  an  appreciable  reduction  in  the  disequilibrium 
between  savings  and  investment  and  to  stimulate  a  durable  growth  in  domestic 
demand. 
12.  Japan's  current  accounts  surplus  was  equal  to  1.8%  of  GNP  in  1983 
and  2.6%  of  GNP  in  1984.  Reflecting  the  growing  trade  imbalance,  it 
threatens  the  stability of  the  international  monetary  system.  In  1984 
the  trade  balance  was  $44  billion  in  the  black  thanks  to  the  strong  export 
1oirect  and  indirect  taxes  amount  to  only  20%  of  GNP  in  Japan  compared 
with  over  25%  in  the  United  States  and  the  Community. - 8  -
performance  (from  1979  to  1984  exports  grew  by  an  average  8.1%  in  real 
terms)  and  modest  Level  of  imports  (which  grew  by  an  average  of  just 
2.4%  a  year  in  the  same  period),  particularly of  manufactured  goods. 
Japan's  emergence  as  a  major  creditor nation  makes  for  further  rigidity. 
By  the  end  of  this  year  its capital  investment  will  total  some$  100 billion. 
The  capital  outlfow  reached$  49  billion  in  1948  and$  38  billion  in  the  first 
7  months  of  1985.  Earnings  from  capital  are  now  increasingly  flowing 
-------. 
in  to  swell  the  current  account  balance,  and  these  are  relatively 
unaffected  by  cyclical  or  exchange  rate  fluctuations.  Accordingly, 
much  Larger  changes  in  the  trade  balance  will  be  needed  to  bring about 
a  redu~tion of  the  current  payments  surplus,  in diametrical  opposition 
to  the  situation facing  the  debt-burdened  developing  countries. 
13.  While  the  current  payments  surplus  has  been  growing,  the  yen  has 
consistently  been weak,  particularly against  the  dollar.  It  has 
appreciated  considerably  against  Community  currencies,  but  it  is questionable 
whether  real  exchange  rates  are  a  valid  measure  of  the  general  competitive 
strength  of  the  Japanese  economy,  especially  considering  the  steady 
piling  up  of  Japan's  current  payments  surplus  with  the  Community,  whether 
measured  in  yen  or  ECU. 
14.  Net  capital  outflows  are essentially  the  result  of  Japan's  excess 
of  savings  and  the  interest  rate differential  between  yen  and  dollar 
investments.  Though  Japanese  interest  rates  are  down  from  their  peaks 
of  1981,  the  monetary  authorities  have  held  the  Bank  of  Japan's  minimum 
Lending  rate  at  5%  since  October  1983  in  order  to  prevent  any  further 
fall  1n  the  yen. 
15.  The  value  of  the  yen  has  also  been  influenced  by  the  reluctance  of 
the  Japanese  authorities  to  Let  their  currency  play  its full  part  in 
the  international  monetary  system. - 9  -
Most  commercial  and  virtually all  capital  market  transactions  have 
traditionally  been  denominated  in  dollars. 
More  recently,  the  authorities  have  embarked  on  a  policy  of  liberalization, 
and  the  yen  is  gradually  beginning  to  be  used  for  external  transactions. 
16.  However,  the  progress  of  liberalization  has  been  uneven  and  somewhat 
Lopsided.  The  dismantling  of  exchange  controls  in  December  1980  enabled 
residents  to  undertake  transactions  abroad,  leading  to major  long-term 
capital  outflows,  mainly  of  funds  for  dollar  investments,  which  weakened 
the  yen.  The  liberalization of  inward  investment  flows,  however,  has 
been  slower  and  less  extensive.  Yen  investments  by  non-residents  are 
linked  to  the  development  of  yen  financial  markets  in  Japan.  While  some 
have  been  liberalized,  interest  rates  on  bank  deposits  are still controlled 
and  the  markets  for  short-term  instruments  are  non-existent  or  rudimentary. 
Foreign  investors  thus  enjoy  only  limited  access.  Another  consequence 
of  this state of  affairs  is  that  Japanese  banks  have  easier access  to 
European  markets,  particularly the  ECU  market,  while  foreign  banks  face 
considerable  problems  in  trying  to establish or  expand  their activities 
in  Japan. 
17.  So  why  is  Japan,  with  its enormous  productive  capacity,  modest 
inflation,  and  slow-growing  private  consumption,  pursuing  macro-economic 
policies  which  stimulate,  or  at  least  are  not  calculated  to  curb,  the 
rise of  the  current  payments  surplus? 
Structure of  the  Japanese  economy 
18.  These  macro-economic  policies are  largely explained  by  the  structure 
of  the  Japanese  economy,  in  which  the  most  dynamic  rapid-growth  sectors - 10  -
are  found  side  by  side  with  uncompetitive activities  which  it  is felt 
necessary  to  preserve  on  political  and  social  grounds.  This  situation 
is  not  unknown  elsewhere,  but  Japan,  while  carrying  out  such  adjustments 
as  are  thought  inevitable,  uses  means  to  prop  up  this  structure which 
are  not  ·found  in  other  countries at  a  comparable  level  of  development. 
19.  The  Japanese  economy  is  heavily dependent  on  imported  energy  and 
raw  materials  Cone  reason  put  forward  by  Japan  for  its  low  Level  of 
manufactured  imports). 
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  policies  followed  by  Japan  in  order 
to  secure  its own  sources  of  supply  sometimes  create  problems  for  its 
partners,  including  the  Community. 
In  the  oil  sector,  where  the  authorities exercise strict control  over 
imports  of  refined products  (to  the  point  at  which  importation  of  certain 
products  is  for  practical  purposes  prohibited)  there  may  well  be  a  tendecny 
towards  a  more  liberal  approach  in  the  near  future.  In  the  course  of  the 
Ministerial  meeting  of  the  International  Energy  Agency  on  July  9,  1985, 
Japan  subscribed  to  a  commitment  "to  seek  to set  in  hand  without  delay  joint 
action  to  maintain  or  create  the  conditions  necessary  to  encourage  importation 
of  refined  products  on  the  basis  of  undistorted  market  determined  supply  and 
demand".  The  report  of  the  subcommittee  of  Japan's  National  Oil  Council,  which 
has  just  been  submitted  to  the  MITI,  looks  towards  a  series of  measures  in 
that  general  sense.  It would  be  desirable  to ensure  that  these  conclusions 
are  given  real  content  in  Japan. 
Public  funds  to  back  mining  investments,  coupled  with  supply  guarantees, 
active  stock  management  and  the  import/export  pricing  policy  are  designed 
to  promote  security  of  raw  material  supplies  while  encouraging  the 
export  of  processed  products. 
20.  Despite  the  scarcity of  agricultural  land  and  the  small  size of 
1  farms  Japan  pursues  a  policy of  self-sufficiency  in  this  sector, 
achieving  an  overall  self-supply  rate of  71%  in  1983  (86%  for  milk 
products,  81%  for  meat  and  just  32%  for  cereals).  The  rate  of  agricultural 
1while  Japan's  population  is  43%  that  of  the  Ten,  it  has  only  1/13th 
as  much  farmland  as  the  Community's.  Average  farm  size  is  1.2 hectares, 
compared  with  16  hectares  in  the  Community  and  160  hectares  in  the  USA. - 11  -
support  is  very  high,  on  average  twice  that  of  the  Community,1  with, 
in particular,  a  high  Level  of  import  protection  which  holds  down 
consumption.  The  government  is  aiming  to  increase  self-sufficiency 
in  milk  products  and  meat,  which  will  mean  a  continuation of  the  policy 
of  importing  raw  materials  unavailable  locally  to  be  processed  by 
farmers  themselves  or  the  agri-food  industry. 
21.  Japanese  industry  is  horizontally  integrated  to  a  very  high  degree, 
within  Large-scale diversified manufacturing  groups.  Smaller  businesses 
often  act  as  sub-contractors  to one  of  the  companies  within  the  group. 
Declining  sectors  <e.g.  Leather  goods  or  footwear)  are  protected  by 
tariff or  non-tariff  barriers, or  are  being  restructured  under  the 
auspices  of  MITI;  Legislation  adopted  in  1983  covers  23  sectors.  Import 
penetration  in  these  sectors  (with  the  exception  of  ferro-silicon  and 
aluminium)  is  low. 
Japan's  industrial  policy  aims  at  the application of  new  technology, 
particularly  information  technology,  in  production  pro~esses and  the 
telecommunications  and  consumer  goods  industries,  and  the  replacement 
of  traditional  raw  materials  by  new  materials,  with  the  help  inter alia 
of  biotechnology.  Although  these  developments  are  theoretically  left 
Largely  to private-sector  initiative,  government  support  ranges  from 
backing  for  joint  research  (e.g.  on  fifth-generation  computers)  to 
contracts  and  procurement  (e.g.  Nippon  Telegraph  and  Telephone),  tax 
incentives,  subsidies  and  loans  repayable  only  if and  when  production 
becomes  profitable  <semi-conductors  and  software). 
In  the  growth  sectors,  Japanese  enterprises  enjoy  considerable  cost 
advantages,  mainly  as  a  result  of  their ability to  maintain  Long 
production  runs  of  standardised products.  Their  commercial  strategy 
frequently  anticipates  price  reductions  attributable to  the  creation 
of  Large  scale  production  capacity. 
22.  Productivity  in  the  service  sector  is generally  lower  in  Japan  than 
in  its main  partners. 
1 Source  Forum  for  policy  innovation,  Tokyo - 12  -
The  banking  sector,  as  noted  above,  has  traditionally  been  regulated  in 
a  way  which  has  made  it  very  difficult  for  foreign  banks  to  gain  access. 
Major  Japanese  banks,  often  members  of  one  of  the  industrial  groups,  have 
1  undergone  remarkable  expansion  both  at  home  and  overseas.  They  co-exist 
with  Less  competitive  local  banks.  The  insurance  business  (with  the  exception 
o-f  re-insurance)  is  Likewise  dominated  by  a  handful  of  big  domestic  companies. 
The  distributive sector  in  Japan  is  a  major  employer,  providing  jobs  for 
23%  of  the  working  population  thanks  to  the  large  numbers  of  small  shopkeepers 
and  multiplicity of  wholesale  businesses.2  Various  administrative directives 
curb  the  spread of  more  modern  forms  of  distribution  such  as  department 
stores,  chain  stores  and  supermarkets. 
Japan's  role  in  the  world  economy 
23.  As  well  as  the  macro-economic,  monetary  and  sectoral  points  noted 
above  we  should  remember  that  interpenetration of  the  Japanese  economy 
and  the  economies  of  its overseas  partners  is  a  recent  phenomenon  and  again 
a  lopsided  one,  both  quantitatively  and  qualitatively. 
24.  Direct  investment  was  liberalized  <except  in  a  few  sectors  - agriculture, 
mining,  energy,  leather  goods)  as  late as  1980.  Japanese  investment  overseas 
has  soared,  reaching  $71.4 billion at  31  March  this  year,  while  foreign 
investments  in  Japan,  though  on  the  increase  since  1980,  totalled  only 
$5  billion  in  March  1984. 
The  total  Japanese  investments  in  the  ten-member  Community  stood  at  $7.7 
<March  1985)  billion,  but  were  largely  concentrated  on  the  banking  and 
commercial  sectors.  Investment  in  manufacturing,  though  on  the  increase, 
accounted  for  only  20%  of  the  total.  A JETRO  study  dating  from  1983  notes 
that  most  production  units  set  up  in  Europe  still get  a  large  proportion 
of  their  equipment  and  components  from  Japan. 
1 
In  1980  only  one  Japanese  bank  was  among  the  top  ten  world  banks,  and 
213  in  the  top  fifty;  by  1984  the  figures  were  5  and  17  respectively. 
Over  60%  of  retailers  employ  just  one  or  two  people;  75%  of  wholesalers 
have  fewer  than  10  employees. - 13  -
Investment  by  Community  firms  in  Japan  remains  on  a  modest  scale: 
$650  million  at  March  1984.  It  is  concentrated essentially  on  a  handful 
of  manufacturing  sectors  (chemicals  and  pharmaceuticals)  and  its growth 
has  not  kept  pace  with  that  of  US  investment. 
25.  Japan  has  traditionally been  a  net  importer  of  technology  and  still 
gets  much  of  this  from  the  Community.  Only  recently  has  the  country  become 
a  significant  exporter  of  technology  in  fields  such  as  electronics  and 
transport  equipment.  Although  there  are  no  formal  curbs  on  the  export 
of  technology,  a  number  of  foreign  companies  have  met  with  reluctance  on 
the  part  of  their  Japanese  opposite  numbers  to  share  know-how  or  participate 
in  joint  ventures  on  third markets. 
26.  In  1984  Japanese  aid  represented  only 0.35%  of  Japan's  GNP  compared 
with  0.53%  for  the  Community.  However,  Japan  more  than  doubled  the  volume  of 
its development  aid  between  1977  and  1980,  and  while  it will  probably fail 
to  achieve  the  target  of  a  further  doublinq  between 1981  and  1985,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  its growth  in  real  terms  is  important.  The  plan  for  the  period 
1986-1992 envisages  a  further  doubling  of  aid  Levels  by  1992  in  comparison 
with  that  achieved  in 1985,represent·ingan amount  of  aid  of  more  than  $40  billion 
over  this period. 
Only  about  a  third  of  Japan's  bilateral  aid  is  in grant  form  (compare  that  with 
the  figure  of  over  three-quarters  for  the  Member  States>,  and  most  of  it goes 
to  Asian  countries. 
II.  THE  COMMUNITY'S  ECONOMIC  AND  TRADE  RELATIONS  WITH  JAPAN 
27.  The  persistence  and  Largely  structural  nature  of  the  Community's  trade 
deficit  with  Japan  are  a  continuing  source  of  concern. 
The  Community's  own  statistics  indicate  that  the  gap  has  widened  still 
further  in  the  Last  two  years,  from  11.6 billion  ECU  1n  1982  to  13.3 billion  ECU 
in  1983  and  15.5  billion  ECU  in  1984,  though  exports  to  Japan  (up  from 
6.3 billion  ECU  in  1982  and  7.3 billion  ECU  in  1983  to  9  billion  ECU  1n 
1984)  actually  grew  slightly faster  than  imports  (up  from  18  billion  ECU - 14  -
in  1982  to  20.6  billion  ECU  in  1983  and  24.5  billion  in  1984).  Japanese 
statistics,  on  the  other  hand,  paint  a  different  picture,  with  the  surplus 
on  trade  with  the  Community  down  from  $10.4  billion  in  1983  to  $10.1  billion 
·n  1984.  However,  if  imports  of  non-monetary  gold  (worth  $790  billion 
;n  1984)  are  excluded,  the  surplus  was  stable at  around  $10.9 billion  in 
:•oth  years. 
rhe  Japanese  figures  for  the  first  six  months  of  this  year  indicate  a  drop 
in  the  surplus  on  trade  with  the  EEC  of  the  order  of  4.8%,  but  this  reflects 
a  9.4%  fall  in  imports  as  well  as  a  7%  drop  in  exports. 
A further  cause  for  anxiety  1s  the  qualitative deterioration  in  trade, 
with  Japan's  exports  to  the  Community  consisting  Largely  of  high  added-
value  products,  while  the  only  Community  exports  making  inroads  on  the 
Japanese  market  are  raw  materials  and  semi-manufactures. 
28.  The  10.4%  of  Japan's  total  exports  which go  to the  EEC  consist  almost 
entirely  of  manufactured  goods,  chiefly  machinery  (electrical,  electronic 
and  other  machinery  and  appliances,  and  transport  equipment),  which  accounts 
for  around  80%  of  the  total  by  value. 
The  Japanese  authorities  gave  the  Community  assurances  that  exports  of 
about  ten  products  would  be  "moderated''  in  1983,  1984  and  1985,  and  a  fall 
in  the  volume  of  exports, has  indeed  been  noted  for  video  recorders,  colour 
television tubes  and  television sets.  By  contrast  in 1984  exports  of  cars 
and  since 1985  exports  of  numerically-controlled  machine  tools  and  machinery 
centres,  have  increased  alarmingly. 
Japanese  exports  of  other  products  have  equally  achieved  impressive  growth 
in  value  terms.1  New  products  in  particular  can  very  quickly  succeed  in 
TI~~-;8-z~--e--:_-p:~-t-s--~-:;-office  equipment  were  up  40%  by  value,  construction 
equipment  up  32%  and  electric  generators  up  26%. - 15  -
capturing  sizeable  market  shares.  There  have  been  some  cases  of  predatory 
pricing,  to  which  European  industry  has  responded  by  filing  anti-dumping 
complaints. 
29.  Although  up  from  their  1982-1984  Levels,  Japan's  imports  from  the 
Community  remain  on  a  fairly  minor  scale,  accounting  for  only  7%  of  the  total. 
Most  of  Japan's  imports  consist  of  raw  materials  and  agricultural  commodities, 
of  which  the  Community  is  not  a  major  exporter to this  country.  Japanese  imports of 
manufactures  are  increasing slightly,  but  are still well  below  those  of  its 
1  main  trading  partners  however  they  are  measured. 
The  recent  trend  of  Community  exports  to  Japan  is  worrying;  in 1984  the  only 
categories  which  have  progress  are  meat  (with  the  resumption  of  Community  pork 
exports),  non-ferrous  metals  and  plastics. 
But  Japan's  imports  from  the  Community  of  many  processed  agricultural  products 
(particularly alcohol),  office  equipment  and  clothing  were  down. 
This  trend  continued  into  the  first  half  of  1985  which  saw  a  9.~ drop  in 
Japanese  imports  from  the  Community;  only  textile  raw  materials  and  mineral 
fuels  were  unaffected. 
Problems  encountered  with  access  to  Japanese  market 
---·------ ·-----
Tariffs,  quotas  and  taxes 
30.  With  a  <significant)  number  of  exceptions,  tariffs  do  not  constitute  a 
real  barrier  to  penetration of  the  Japanese  market. 
1 Imports  of  manufactures  <1984) 
biLLions  of  dollars 
% of  total  imports 
% of  GNP 






EEC  USA 
138.0  231.9 
44.0  65.7 
6.3  7.8 
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The  highest  remaining  barriers  tend  to  apply  to  certain agricultural  products 
(duties  of  25  to  40%,  sometimes  combined  with  quantitative  restrictions), 
curbing  Community  exports  primarily  in  the  following  sectors: 
-alcoholic drinks  (wine,  whisky,  brandy,  etc.):  tariffs are  considerably 
higher  for  bottled  imports;  in  addition  excise duties  penalize  high-quality 
products; 
- biscuits,  chocolate,  confectionery  (total  imports  were  equivalent  to  only 
2.5%  of  Japanese  production  in  1983  compared  to  4%  in  1979); 
-natural  cheese  <duty  of  30%)  and  dairy  products.  <High  duties  and  quotas). 
In  the  industrial  sector,  high  rates  of  duty still apply  to  menthol,  citric 
acid,  certain articles of  clothing,  leather  and  footwear  (including  ski 
boots).  Leather  goods  and  leather  footwear  are  also  subject  to  very  severe 
quantitative  restrictions. 
Quantitative  restrictions  - which  also  apply  to  certain meats,  canned  fruit 
and  vegetables,  products  derived  from  cereals  and  fishery  products  - are 
often  administered  in  a  manner  lacking  in  transparency  and  incompatible  with 
the  GATT  Code  on  import  Licencing  procedures. 
Public  procurement  -------------------
31.  The  Japanese  authorities  have  only  made  limited efforts  to  buy  foreign 
products.  Most  purchases  coming  under  the  GATT  Code  on  government  procurement 
have  involved  direct  contracts,  and  import  penetration  has  been  Low. 
Other  difficulties  derive  from  tight  deadlines  for  tenders  and  deliveries, 
complex  qualification  procedures  which  vary  according  to  the  body  concerned, 
deposit  requirements,  etc.  As  a  result  foreign  suppliers'  access  to 
Japanese  public  contracts  has  been  hampered  or discouraged.  The  Community 
has  raised  these  questions  with  the Japanese  authorities  on  numerous  occasions 
and  has  made  proposals  for  adoption  of  a  procedure  more  in  Line  with  the 
spirit  of  the  GATT  Code. - 17  -
St~n_c:l~!_.9_~L  _  __test_i ng  and  certification procedures 
32.  Despite  Japan  being  a  signatory  to  the  GATT  Code  on  technical  barriers 
to  trade,  foreign  exporters  have  run  into a  Large  number  of  difficulties,  in 
particular: 
- the  development  of  technical  specifications peculiar  to  the  Japanese  market 
and  the  Low  Level  of  Japanese  participation  in  international  standardization 
bodies; 
- the  Lack  of  transparency  and,  in  some  cases,  the  ambiguity  of  regulations, 
Leaving  the  public  authorities  a  wide  margin  of  discretion; 
- over-meticulous  examination  and  certification procedures; 
delegation  of  the  inspection  of  certain  products  to  Japanese  non-
governmental  bodies; 
non-acceptance  of  tests  carried out  in  exporting  countries,  so  that  Long 
and  costly  examinations  have  to  be  repeated  in  Japan  (particularly  for 
pharmaceutical  products); 
a  total  ban  on  certain  imports  on  health  or  pla~ health  grounds. 
The  Community  has  submitted  to  and  discussed  with  the  Japanese  authorities 
numerous  specific  requests  relating  to  the  following  products: 
food  products  (additives),  chemicals,  agro-chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals,  cosmetics,  electrical  appliances,  telecommunications 
equipment,  medical  equipment,  motor  vehicles,  flowers  and  bulbs,  fruits. 
Whilst  some  progress  has  been  achieved  in  certain of  these areas,  most  problems 
rema-in. 
Import  procedures 
33.  Japan's  adoption  of  the  GATT  Code  on  customs  valuation  and  the 
simplification of  customs  procedures  proper  have  indubitably  improved  the 
situation,  ~Lthough disputes  regarding  classification arise  from  time  to 
time. - 18  -
However,  the  application  of  regulations  other  than  customs  regulations  proper 
(technical  standards,  health  and  veterinary controls,  etc.)  can  involve 
Lengthy  delays  before  goods  are  cleared  through  customs,  since  the  various 
controls  have  to  be  carried  out  by  different  administrative  services. 
Services 
34.  In  the  banking  sectorr  the  76  foreign  banks  represented  in  Japan  in  ------· 
1985  C25  from  the  Community)  only  accounted  for  0.78%  of  total  deposits  and 
3.57%  of  loans  (3.50%  in  1980)  and  their profits  were  down  10%  in  1983-84  on 
the  preceding  year. 
Despite  undeniable  progress  made  recently,  foreign  banks'  operations  in  Japan 
are still  hampered  by  the  strict  control  of  interest  rates,  rudimentary 
secondary  markets,  the  need  to  provide  collateral  to operate  on  these  markets 
and  a  series of  criteria or  qualifications  restricting  admission  to  certain 
activities.  These  official  restrictions  are  compounded  by  the  tendency  of 
the big  Japanese  groups  to  deal  mainly  with  financial  institutions  belonging 
to  the  same  group. 
35.  The  insurance  sector  is also strictly  regulated.  Admission  of  new 
companies  and  permission  for  established  companies  to  offer  new  products  are 
subject  to official  authorizations  which  are difficult  to  obtain. 
36.  It  is practically  impossible  for  foreign  lawyers  to  set  themselves  up 
in  Japan  as  consultants,  this  activity being strictly  regulated  by  the 
Japanese  Federation  of  Bar  Associations  CNichihenren). 
37.  Given  thdt,qenerally  speakinr],firms  established or  wishing  to  establish 
themselves  on  a  foreign  market  prefer  to  rely  on  the  service  companies  with 
which  they  deal  habitually  in  their  country  of  origin,  the  difficulties 
encountered  by  foreign  service  companies  on  the  Japanese  market  affect  the 
performance  of  European  industrial  and  trading  firms  in  that  country. - 19  -
Distribution 
38.  Japan's  involved  and  complex  distribution system- often directly or 
indirectly  controlled  by  Japanese  producers  constitutes 
an  obstacle  to  the  marketing  of  imported  products,  particularly of  consumer  goods. 
Studies  carried out  in  Japan  by  governmental  agencies  have  always  concluded 
that  there  is  no  particular  problem  as  regards  fair  competition,  though 
vigilance  should  be  maintained.  However  these  studies  did  not  investigate 
the  degree  of  integration of  producers  and  distributors,  exclusive  purchasing 
obligations,  on-discounts  and  credit  terms,  etc. 
The  country's  big  department  stores  and  supermarkets  would  seem  particularly 
suitable  candidates  for  marketing  imported  products,  but  their  expansion  is 
rigorously  limited  by  the  1974  law  on  large  retail  shops  and  informal 
administrative directives,  which  were  renewed  in  1984.  Moreover  the  vast 
majority  of  supermarkets  cannot  sell  alcohol  or  tobacco. 
Intellectual  property  -------C.--' 
39.  Import  penetration of  the  Japanese  market  is  also  hampered  or  delayed 
by  problems  with  intellectual  property  rights. 
The  registering of  patents  and  trade  marks  is extremely  slow  (six  years  and 
three  to  four  years  respectively)  and  those  wishing  to  oppose  the 
registration of  their  patents  or  trade  marks  by  Japanese  residents  have  no 
right  of  appeal  with  the  Patent  Office. 
The  counterfeiting of  European  products,  particularly  luxury  goods,  continues 
to  be  a  widespread  phenomenon  owing  to  a  failure  to  take  proceedings  or  apply 
effectively  the  sanctions  laid  down  by  law. 
In  addition  numerous  Japanese  products  are  presented  in  such  a  way 
as  to  suggest  European  origin  (use  of  names,  symbols,  flags,  etc.) 
This  phenomenon  is  particularly prevalent  in  the  wine  and  alcohol  sector 
(labelling of  bottles). - 20  -
III.  MEASURES  TAKEN  BY  THE  JAPANESE  GOVERNMENT  AND  THEIR  EFFECTS 
40.  Following  numerous  requests  from  its main  trading  partners  (EEC,  USA, 
Canada,  Australia,  Korea  and  the  ASEAN  countries)  Japan  has  acted  since  1981 
to mitigate  the  damage  caused  to their  economies  by  its current  account  surplus 
by  announcing  seven  successive  series  of  measures  aimed  at  opening  up  its 
market  and  promoting  imports.  In  addition  the  country's  system  of  standards 
and  certification procedures  has  undergone  revision  in  the  wake  of  the  report 
of  an  interministerial  committee  (headed  by  Mr  Gotoda)  in  March  1983. 
Liberalization of  Japanese  financial  markets  has  been  undertaken  following  the 
1984  joint  "yen/dollar"  report  by  the  Japanese  Ministry  of  Finance  and  the 
American  Treasury  Department.  And  Lastly  the  Japanese  Government  announced 
a  three-year  Programme  of  Action  on  30  July  Last. 
The  Programme  is  the  product  of  interdepartmental  collaboration.  Many  points 
regarding  its substance,  implementation  and  timing  remain  ambiguous  or  obscure. 
The  Commission  is  currently  seeking  clarification  from  the  ministries and bodies 
concerned.  However,  its  joint  study  of  the  Programme  with  the  Member  States 
gives  some  idea  of  the  results  Likely  to  be  attained. 
Tariffs  and  quotas 
41.  The  seven  series  of  measures  announced  since  1981  include  numerous 
decisions  relating  to  customs  duties.  Besides  repeatedly  accelerating 
implementation  of  its  Tokyo  Round  concessions  Cbut  with  a  time-Lag  for 
agricultural  products),  Japan  has  reduced  or  totally  suspended  a  Large  number 
of  customs  duties.  These  reductions  have  affected  a  number  of  products  of  which 
the  E~C  is  an  exporter,  amonq  which  are  whisky,  cognac,  wine,  cigarettes, 
c6nfectionery,  biscuits,  chocolate,  menthol,  machine  tools,  ~ut diamonds, 
electrical  and  electronic  equipment,  medical  equipment,  tractors,  parts of 
motor  vehicles,  clothing  and  skis ••• - 21  -
lhe  Action  Programme  announced  the  abolition of  certain  low 
duties  and  the  reduction  or  total  s~spension of duties .in  1986  for  more  than 
1800  products  including wine,(1),  whisky,  hrAnrly,nrAparation  for  baking, 
menthol,  ties,  certain car  parts,  skis  and  accessories. 
Th~se reductions  are  certainly  welcome  but  as  most  relate  to  rates  of  duty 
which  are  already  comparatively  low,  the  benefits  to  be  expected  i~ terms  of 
increased  sales  will  probably  not  be  very  con~iderable.  Furthermore, 
those  high  tariff  and  excise  charges  affecting  certain products  exported  by 
the  Ccmmunity  have  not  been  subiect  to  significant  reductions. 
42.  Successive  packages of  measures  have  made  little change  in  the  quotas 
and  other quantitative  restrictions affecting products  exported  by  the 
Community  except  in  the  case  of  pigmeat  and  a  few  processed  agricultural 
products(fruit  juices,  food  preparations). 
The  Action  Programme  contains  nothing of  consequence  in  this area.  As 
regards  leather  and  leather  shoes,  Japan  intends  replacing  quotas  with  higher 
rates  of  duty  (th~se are  already  very  high- between  20  and  27%).  The  United 
States  has  indicated  that  it will  invoke  Section  301  of  the  Trade  Act  if  its 
demandsare  not  met  by  1  December  1985. 
Public  contracts  and  monopolies 
43.  The  Action  Programme  contains  a  series  of  measures  aimed  at  reforming 
procurement  procedures  to  make  things  easier  for  foreign  suppliers.  The 
most  important  point  is the  intention  to  make  uniform  qualification 
procedures  in  each  Japanese  Ministry  or  agency.  The  Japanese  authorities  have 
also  promised  to  review  direct-aqreement  procedures  and  to extend  tendering 
and  delivery  deadlines  as  of  1  October  1°85.  According  to  information  made 
publ1c  by  the  government  of  Japan .on  September  30,  the  greater  part  of 
these  measures  have  been  put  into effect  ;  modification  of  procurement 
procedures  of  certain Minsiteries  will  take  effect  on  January  1,  1986. 
n-r-Fo~ wines  the  reductions  will  not  take  place  until  1987. - 2 2  -
41,_  Dp·;pitf'  it•;  privatization on  1  April  1985,  N-ippon  Telegraph  and 
lell'phorH'  will  r·em<.Jin  subject  to  the  GATT  Code  for  its  purchases  of 
consumables  and  to  the  provisions  of  a  bilateral  agreement  with  the 
United  States  Copen  to  all  suppliers)  on  purchases  of  more  sophisticated 
products.  It  should  however  be  noted  that  the  purchases  made  by  NTT 
abroad  to  date  (mainly  in  the  United  States)  have  been  quite  insignificant. 
The  manufactured  tobacco  monopoly  has  also  been  denationalized  but  the 
marketing  of  products  of  foreign  origin  remains  subject  to  certain 
conditions  <registration of  prices,  Limitations  on  distribution  and 
d  .  .  )  1  a  vert1s1ng  . 
~-~_ll-~~'!_s_~!:_S_!ing,_certification and  import  procedures 
45.  In  response  to  pressure  from  the  country's  partners  and  following 
an  investigation  by  an  interministerial  committee  (headed  by  Mr  Gotoda), 
the  Japanese  authorities  in  March  1983  announced  the  amendment  of 
eighteeen  Laws  so  as  to  provide  foreign  producers  with  non-discriminatory 
access  to  the  Japanese  certification  systems  (which  it was  required  to 
provide  anyway  under  its GATT  obligations)  and  their  intention  to  improve 
transparency,  internationalize their  standards,  promote  acceptance  of  the 
results  of  tests  carried out  abroad  and  simplify  their  certification 
procedures. 
Implementation  of  these  intentions  has,  however,  been  slow  and  has  not, 
generally  speaking,  corresponded  to  Community  expectations.  While  some 
progress  has  been  made  (in particular simplification of  the  procedure  for 
approval  of  prototypes  of  motor  vehicles),  in other  areas  acceptance  of 
international  standards  (electrical  equipment)  or  of  tests  carried out 
abroad  (pharmaceuticals  and  agro-chemicals)  has  been  hedged  round  with 
exceptions  or  prior  conditions  which  allow  serious obstacles  to  remain. 
The  new  Action  Programme  features  a  number  of  very  positive principles: 
the  limitation  of  government  intervention  (with  freedom  as  the  rule  and 
restrictions  becoming  the  exception),  the  reaffirmation of  the  guidelines 
that  emerged  from  the  Gotoda  Committee's  study  <indicating  acknowledgement 
of  the  inadequacy  of  progress  made  to  date). 
1The  United  States  recently  brought  an  action  under  Section  301  against 
Japanese  practices  in  the  tobacco  sector. - 23  -
An  examination  of  the  modifications,  sector  by  sector,  indicate  a  degree  v~ 
progress  which  could  benefit  Community  ex~o~ters,  such  as  a  partial  Liberalisa-
t.  ·i l•n  of  apprrwa l  procedure·:.  for  cosrr;P.t i cs  further  harmoni ".at ion  of  standards  for 
electrical appliances  to those  of  international  standard<;,  imprc·,ement  in  some 
of  the  procedures  for  importing  motor  vehicles.  However,  even  in those  !eetors 
mentioned  above,  the modifications  envisaged  have  not  been  spelled out  in all 
their deta1ls  and  will only  be  introduced  progressively in the  course  of  the 
three  year  perjod  of the  programme.  In  their sectors,  such  as  the  acceptance 
of  tests  done  in Europe  for  pharmaceutical  products,  our  exporters  continue 
to  feel  uncertainties. 
It is also envisaged  by  the  Japanese  authqrities  to  set  up  an  administrative 
machinery  to monitor  implementation  of  the  programme. 
Services 
46.  As  regards  financial  services,  th~  recommendations  of  the 1983 
"yen/dollar"  report  have  been  followed  up  with  measures  which  can  be 
classified in  the  following  three categories: 
- promotion  of  the  internationalization of  the  yen  through  improved  access 
to issues of  bonds  in Euro-yen,  and  the  introduction of  new  medium-
and  long-term  instruments  in Euro-yen.  The  latter being  reserved  mainly 
for  non-residents,  however,  the  Euro-yen  market  remains  relatively 
insignificant; 
- relaxation of  money-market,  capital  and  exchange  conditions:  liberalization 
of  the  conditions of  issue  of  deposit  certificates,  introduction of  new 
instruments,  creation of  a  yen  bankers  acceptance  market,  forthcoming 
creation of  a  futures  market  for  bonds,  etc.; 
- access  for  certain foreign  financial  institutions to market  segments 
under  certain conditions  of  qualifications:  Licences  to operate  on  the 
medium- and  long-term public  bond  market,  the  issue to nine  banks  <one 
from  the  EEC)  of  trust banking  licences,  an  i~crease from  83  to  93  in 
the  number  of  seats on  the  Tokyo  stock  exchange. - 24  -
lh1·  Acti(,n  Prograrnuo<:  l1~ts  a  number  of  +cllow-up  measures  to  this 
pr0gre~sive liberalization  proc~s~. 
Such  liberalization takes  considerable  account  of  the·  ~nterests cf 
the  big  Japanese  finance  groups;  it  is  being  conducted  at  a  cautious 
pace  and  the  practice  of  administrative directives  will  no  doubt  be 
continued.  Foreign  banks  are still  impeded  by  the  operation  of  interest 
rate  ceilings  for  deposits (1)  and  by  insuffir.ie~t  short-term monetary 
irostruments. 
47.  In  the  insurance  sector,  the  Action  ~rogramme  provides  for  a 
relaxation  of  the  conditions  of  issue  of  Licences  for  new  instruments  or 
services. 
The  use  of  small-capacity  airplanes  and  helicopters  fer  short  trips  will 
be  facilitated  (but  the  problem often resides  in  weak  infrastructure). 
Lastly,  the  Government  hopes  to find  a  solution to  the pro9lem  of  foreign 
legal  consultants  but  its allusions  to the  autonomy  of  the  traditionally 
restrictive  Japanese  Federation of  Bar  Associations  does  not  augur  well 
for  substantial  progress  in  this  field  (the  Community  wants  to  see  this 
profession put  under  the  control  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice  instead  of 
the  Japanese  Bar>. 
Other  measures 
48.  The  Japanese  Government  recognizes  that  the  distribution  system  has 
an  important  role  to  play  in  increasing  imports  but,  apart  from  relaxation 
of  the  conditions  governing  certain promotional  sales,  it  has  only 
announced  some  further  fact-finding  stliC1ies  into  business  practices  in 
this  sector  and  into  the  distribution  of  imported  products. 
An  "anti-counterfeit  squad"  is  to  be  set  up  within  the  police  force. 
However  no  measures  have  been  announced  on  misleading  Labelling  or  the 
registration  and  protection of  patents  and  trade  marks. 
C1)  In  applying  the  Action  Programm~  the  interest  rates  for  deposits  in 
excess  of  one  billion yen  have  been  freed  since  October  1,  1985  and 
the  liberalisation of  rates  of  interest  on  deposits  of  more  than 
100  million  yen  is  planned  for  Spring  1987. .  -- 25  -
P rornn I ion  of  _i!r~p-~r· t s 
49.  The  Japanese  authorities  have  announced  various  measures  to  promote 
imports  on  different  occasions. 
In  1983  the  Import-Export  Bank  extended  the  possibility of  loans  with 
interest-rate subsidies,  up  to  then  only  available  for  imports  of  raw 
materials,  to  manufactures.  Similarly  the  Japanese  Development  Bank 
now  offers  loans  at  reduced  rates of  interest  to  promote  direct  investment 
in  Japan.  The  Japan  External  Trade  Organization  (JETRO)  has  been 
entrusted with  the  promotion  of  imports  and  investments. 
The  Prime  Minister  has  personally  Launched  a  campaign  aimed  at  promoting 
the  buying  of  foreign  products.  The  Minister  of  International  Trade  and 
Industry  has  requested  134  big  Japanese  companies  (industrial  undertakings, 
trading  companies,  chain  stores)  to  draw  up  programmes  for  purchases  of 
foreign  products  and  equipment.  Various  fairs  concentrating  on  imported 
products  have  been  organized  with  the  help  of  MIPRO  (Manufactured  Imports 
Promotion  Organisation)1;  purchasing  research  and  purchasing missions  have 
been  sent  abroad. 
It  is difficult  to  measure  the  impact  of  the  above  initiatives which,  while 
certainly  evidence  of  good  will,  sometimes  only  serve  to  reinforce  th2 
"exotic"  image  of  imported  products  and  are  rarely  followed  up  by  any 
medium- or  Long-term  measures. 
These  promotional  initiatives  have  not  been  accompanied  by  any  foreign 
procurement  policy  on  the  part  of  the  services  or  organizations  controlled 
2  by  the  Government.  On  the  contrary:  in  certain cases  (satellites), 
the  policy  of  developing  a  national  industry  has  been  reaffirmed. 
* 
*  * 
1
However  there exists  certain difficulties  for  the participation of 
Eur9pean  industries  in  certain fairs  and  specialized exhibitions. 
2 Except  for  some  purchases  made  by  Nippon  Telegraph  and  Telephone  (mainly 
in  the  USA)  and  a  few  token  orders. - 26  -
For  its part  the  Commission  has  pursued  its business  programme,  aimed  at 
familiarizing  Community  executives  with  the  realities of  the  Japanese 
market;  it  includes  specific  operations  intended  to  benefit  particular 
sectors  as  a  whole.  Given  the  very  encouraging  results  obtained  to  date, 
the  Commiss,ion  believes  that it is  necessary to develop  actions  in this field. 